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The phrase "fireside inductions" has been used to describe
those common-sense empirical generalizations about human behav-
ior which derive from introspection, anecdotal evidence, and cultur-
ally transmitted beliefs.' The psychology of the fireside roughly
corresponds to what people believe about human behavior and how
such behavior is to be described and explained. By and large, the
law reflects these fireside inductions, which sometimes do and some-
times do not accord with behavioral science principles. There are
occasional instances, however, when the fireside inductions are not
represented in the law, and behavioral science research is examined
to support, refute, or reconcile particular fireside inductions. Death-
qualification is such an instance.
The problems which revolve around death-qualification intro-
duce significant constitutional questions which are currently being
considered in Grigsby v. Mabry.2 The focus of this article, however,
* B.A., M.A., and Ph. D., University of Arkansas at Fayetteville, Post-Doctoral study
in psychobiology at the University of Chicago, Associate Professor of Psychology and Crim-
inal Justice, University of Arkansas at Little Rock. (For information about unpublished
studies cited in this article, contact the author).
1. Meehi, Law and the Fireside Inductions- Some Reflections of a Clinical Psychologist,
LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY (J. Tapp & F. Levine eds. 1977).
2. Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Ark.), mod#Fed, reh'ggranted, 637 F.2d
525 (8th Cir. 1980). The primary constitutional issue centers on whether death qualification
violates the sixth and fourteenth amendment guarantees to a fair and impartial jury.
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is on the psycho-legal issue of death-qualified juries: the lawmaker's
use of behavioral science research and the fireside induction. This
article first explores the issue of death-qualification and then the
fireside induction relative to that issue. These topics are followed by
a discussion of how behavioral science research might affect the fire-
side induction. Relevant research will then be examined. Finally,
conclusions and recommendations will be discussed.
THE DEATH-QUALIFICATION ISSUE
Death-qualification is best considered in the context of the fol-
lowing table3 which illustrates the variety of potential community
viewpoints toward administering the death penalty against an indi-
vidual convicted of a capital offense.
TABLE 1
Penalty Preference Toward Guilty Defendants For
Different Death-Penalty Attitudes
Attitude Toward Death Penalty
Automatic Favor death Indifferent Oppose death Automatic
death penalty penalty group group penalty group life-
group imprisonment
group
will always favors death neither favors opposes or will always
vote for death penalty but nor opposes has doubts vote for life
penalty will not vote the death about death imprisonment
instead of life to impose it penalty penalty but instead of
imprisonment in every case will not vote death penalty
against it in
every case
Until 1968, the practice in many states was to eliminate from
capital cases those potential jurors who expressed opposition to the
death penalty, jie., those individuals characterized as belonging to
either the "oppose death penalty" or the "automatic life-imprison-
ment" groups of Table 1. Exclusion was accomplished during the
voir dire, when stated opposition to the death penalty could result in
removal for cause. Elimination of opponents of the death penalty
resulted in a "death-qualified" jury.
3. Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980)
(table is an adaptation of materials reported in Hovey).
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Oberer4 traced the origin of the death-qualification practice to a
time when conviction of a capital offense was automatically fol-
lowed by the death penalty. Since a finding of guilt implied death,
opposition to the death penalty conceivably could interfere with the
determination of guilt. Death-qualified juries were therefore con-
sidered essential to the enforcement of the criminal law.5 The prac-
tice of death-qualification was retained even as variations in
sentencing developed which functionally separated the trial process
into two stages: a guilt phase and a sentencing phase. In the guilt
phase, capital trial jurors must decide whether the defendant is
guilty of a crime for which he may receive the death penalty. If
guilt is determined during this initial phase, the jury must then de-
cide whether to impose the death penalty in the sentencing phase.
In Witherspoon v. Illinois6 the United States Supreme Court al-
tered the defining attributes of a death-qualified jury. The Court
reasoned that it was "self-evident" 7 that juries formed by excluding
prospective jurors on the basis of "general objections to the death
penalty' 8 could not "speak for the community"9 and were "uncom-
monly willing to condemn a man to die."' 0 In the Court's view,
procedural fairness required that "the decision whether a man de-
serves to live or die must be made on scales that are not deliberately
tipped toward death."" The Court ruled that the only prospective
jurors who could constitutionally be eliminated because of their op-
position to capital punishment were:
[T]hose who made unmistakably clear (1) that they would auto-
matically vote against the imposition of capital punishment with-
out regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of
the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death
penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision
as to the defendant's guilt.
12
The practical consequence for most states was that capital trial
jurors were excluded for cause only when they stated adamant op-
4. Oberer, Does Disqualpicaidon ofJurorsfor Scruples Against Capital Punishment Con-
stitute a Denial ofFair Trial on the Issue of Guilt?, 39 TEx. L. REV. 545 (1961).
5. Id. at 550.
6. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
7. Id. at 518.
8. Id. at 522.
9. Id. at 520.
10. Id. at 521.
11. Id. at 521-22 n.20.
12. d. at 522-23 n.21.
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position to the death penalty. 13 That is, a death-qualified jury by
Witherspoon standards includes not only those jurors death-quali-
fled by traditional standards, but also those potential jurors who
comprise the "oppose death penalty" group of Table 1. In terms of
Table 1, a jury qualified under Witherspoon standards excludes only
those individuals adamantly opposed to the death penalty. This ex-
cluded group can also be designated as "Witherspoon-Excludables"
(WEs).
The Court in Witherspoon also considered whether the exclu-
sion of jurors with scruples against the death penalty resulted, at the
guilt phase of a trial, in a "tribunal organized to convict"14 so that a
representative, impartial determination of guilt could not be as-
sured. Three unpublished studies were considered as evidence that
death-qualified jurors were more likely to convict than were pro-
spective jurors excludable on the basis of their opposition to the
death penalty.15 The Court found these data "too tentative and
fragmentary to establish that jurors not opposed to the death pen-
13. For a review of exclusionary practices among the various states, see Annot., 39
A.L.R.3d 550 (1971).
14. 391 U.S. at 521 (quoting Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 294 (1947)).
15. The petitioner in Witherspoon did not submit experimental evidence on this issue
until the case was before the Supreme Court. The Court was requested to take judicial
notice of three unpublished summaries of psychological research. These studies were:
(a) W. Wilson, Beliefin Capital Punishment and Jury Performance (University of
Texas, 1964) (unpublished manuscript).
(b) F. Goldberg, Attitude Toward Capital Punishment and Behavior as a Juror in
Simulated Cases (Morehouse College, undated) (unpublished manuscript),
subsequently published as Goldberg, Toward Expansion of Withersoon. Cap-
ital Scruples, Jury Bias, and the Use of Psychological Data to Raise Presump-
tions in the Law, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 53 (1970).
(c) H. Zeisel, Some Insights into the Operation of Criminal Juries (University of
Chicago, 1957) (unpublished manuscript), subsequently published as H.
Zeisel, Some Data on Juror Attitudes Toward Capital Punishment (Center for
Studies of Criminal Justice, University of Chicago Law School, 1968) [herein-
after cited as Zeisel].
After the petition for certiorari was filed, the Zeisel summary was withdrawn, apparently
because Zeisel had not authorized its use in unfinished form. The brief submitted by
Witherspoon relied on only the studies by Wilson and by Goldberg. Since these studies
were available only in preliminary form, and since they had not been subjected to the scru-
tiny they would have received had they been offered as evidence to the trier of fact, the
Supreme Court noted:
[W]e can only speculate ...as to the precise meaning of the terms used in the
studies, the accuracy of the techniques employed, and the validity of the general-
izations made. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the amicus cu-
riae brief filed by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund stated that
with respect to bias in favor of the prosecution on the issue of guilt, the record is
almost lacking in the sort of factual information that would assist the Court.
Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 517-18 n.18.
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alty tend to favor the prosecution in the determination of guilt"' 6 or
that the "exclusion of jurors opposed to capital punishment. . . in-
creases the risk of conviction."'
' 7
Thus the Court did not decide the legal question whether a ju-
ror's attitude concerning the death penalty is so related to his ten-
dency to convict or acquit that special rules are required for jury
selection. The Court encouraged continued research on the ques-
tion, however.' 8 In terms of Table 1, the unresolved issue is whether
the "automatic life-imprisonment" group, excludable by Wither-
spoon standards, includes a subset of "Witherspoon-Excludable"
subjects who, in spite of their adamant opposition to the deathpen-
alty, could nevertheless render a fair and impartial determination of
guilt and who should not, therefore, be excluded from participation
at the guilt phase of a capital trial.' 9
The group excludable under Witherspoon standards is com-
prised of two distinct sub-groups which have in common that they
would never vote for the death penalty in the sentencing phase. The
distinction between the sub-groups lies in their impartiality, or the
lack of it, at the guilt phase. One sub-group is not impartial, know-
ing that a guilty vote may ultimately mean death. Members of this
sub-group are conventionally described as "Nullifiers," and it is
agreed that they are properly excluded from both phases of a capital
trial. Members of the other sub-group state that they can be impar-
tial on the issue of guilt or innocence. The issue raised by Wither-
spoon is whether the latter sub-group should be included at the guilt
phase of a capital trial. Members of the impartial sub-group are
sometimes described by the term "Guilt-Phase Includables."
The lawmaker who must decide whether to include the impar-
tial sub-group may inquire whether there is a difference in the will-
ingness to convict of two classes of potential jurors: those who are
death-qualified by Witherspoon standards and those who are ex-
cluded by Witherspoon standards. To answer the question, the
lawmaker may refer to the fireside induction and to behavioral sci-
ence research.
16. 391 U.S. at 517-18.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 520 n.18. The Court noted that a future defendant might still attempt to
establish that a jury, death-qualified by Wiherspoon standards, "was less than neutral with
respect to guilt." Id.
19. The continued exclusion of these subjects from the penalty phase of the trial is not
in issue. Continued exclusion from both phases of a trial of those subjects whose opposition




The fireside induction suggests that in those cases in which the
evidence is compelling, impartial jurors will vote to convict or ac-
quit on the basis of the evidence, regardless of their attitude toward
the death penalty. In equivocal or ambiguous cases in which the
evidence is less compelling, however, jurors from the two "favor
death penalty" groups at the left of Table 1 are more likely to vote
for conviction; jurors from the two "oppose death penalty" groups
at the right of Table 1 are more likely to vote for acquittal. Further,
the strength of the tendency to convict or acquit is directly related to
whether the juror holds one of the more extreme attitudes so that,
for example, the automatic death penalty group would more likely
vote for conviction in an equivocal case than would those who sim-
ply "favored" the death penalty. At the other end of the continuum,
WEs would more likely vote for acquittal than would those simply
"opposing" the death penalty. Broadly stated, the fireside induction
suggests that proponents of the death penalty are conviction-prone
and opponents of the death penalty are acquittal-prone.2" Stated in
terms of the issue raised by Witherspoon, the fireside induction is
that WEs are less likely to convict (more likely to acquit) than a
group of Witherspoon -qualified jurors.
The objection may be made that this estimate of the fireside
induction is biased toward the defense because many defense attor-
neys not only articulate the belief that proponents of the death pen-
alty are conviction-prone relative to opponents of the death penalty,
but also endorse the status of the induction as that which "everyone
knows." Indeed, Witherspoon and subsequent cases2 I represent re-
20. The perception of one group as either conviction- or acquittal-prone relative to the
other depends upon whether the group is viewed from the perspective of the defense or that
of the prosecution. The defense typically chooses to focus on "conviction-prone" to describe
jurors included in a capital trial, while prosecutors focus on excluded jurors as "acquittal-
prone." The neutral question is whether there is a reliable difference in the frequency of
guilty verdicts returned between proponents and opponents of the death penalty.
21. Comment, Grigsby v. Mabry.- A New Look at Death-Qual/ied Juries, 18 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 145, 145-63 (1980). The author cites twenty-two cases heard in federal and state
courts which have rejected the claim that the sixth amendment impartiality requirement is
violated by death-qualified juries. Id. at 161-62 n. 154. The author states:
A chronological analysis of the holdings of some of these cases may provide an
insight into the reluctance of these courts to accept the open invitation of Wither-
spoon. . . . As each new study or piece of evidence came out after Witherspoon,
starting with the finished drafts of the Witherspoon evidence. . .the issue was reliti-
gated. See State v. Ramirez, 116 Ariz. 259, 569 P.2d 201 (1977) (tacit admission
that studies persuasive, but not enough since Witherspoon to dispel fragmentary
label); Clark v. Fike, 538 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976) (although definite "pattern or
[Vol. 5:1
DEATH-QUALIFIED JURIES
curring attempts by defense attorneys to convince the courts that the
induction is valid. However, since prosecutors have vigorously op-
posed incorporating the alleged induction into law, it may be hy-
pothesized that there exists a countervailing prosecution induction
to the effect that proponents of the death penalty are not more likely
to convict than those who oppose the death penalty. The author
submits that there is no countervailing induction and that the prose-
cution shares the view of the fireside induction held by the defense.
The basis for the argument of a shared view of the induction will be
fully developed below, in "The Fireside Revisited." The conclusion
to be anticipated is that the opposition by the prosecution, like the
advocacy by the defense, is based on perceived self-interest.
The position of the defense is straightforward: jurors favoring
the death penalty are conviction-prone; the inclusion of WEs would
increase the chances for acquittal by neutralizing, to some extent,
the tendency of death-qualified juries to convict. The position taken
by the prosecution is slightly more complex; jurors opposed to the
death penalty are seen as acquittal-prone; the inclusion of acquittal-
prone WEs would decrease the probability of obtaining a convic-
tion. In addition to the danger of a decreased conviction rate, pro-
posed solutions to the accommodation of WEs in capital cases
involve considerations of added cost and inconvenience. The irony
of the prosecution's position is that, because they think the fireside
induction is valid and that legal implementation may hinder the
prosecution's case, it is in their interest to oppose incorporation of
the induction into the law. As a consequence, the prosecution's pro-
induction view is cloaked in anti-induction rhetoric.
Before the behavioral science research is examined to support,
refute, or reconcile the fireside induction, it would be instructive to
examine the lawmaker's use of behavioral science research and the
fireside induction.
correlation" shown by studies, evidence still too fragmentary). On this one by one
basis, however, the courts were reluctant to dispel the "too tentative and fragmen-
tary" label when only one more study had been added since the last time the issue
was approached. See Townsend v. Twomey, 452 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1971) (too few
new studies since the evidence was last declared "too tentative and fragmentary").
Little heed was paid to the fact that many more studies had been added since the
evidence was originally found to have been "too tentative and fragmentary." In
this way, twelve years of wholly consistent studies, no less than fourteen in
number, had been disregarded as "tentative and fragmentary."
Id. at 162 n.155.
1982]
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RESEARCH AND THE FIRESIDE INDUCTION
The judicial process has not been quick to rely on the findings
of behavioral science research. It was not until Ballew v. Georgia,22
in which the Court established a minimum jury size of six in state
criminal cases, that "social science research was elevated from the
footnotes into the text of a Supreme Court opinion. ' 23 The primary
reason for the lack of reliance on behavioral science research seems
to be that very little of such research is available in a form that can
assist judicial decisions, :e., the research was either not designed to
produce information relevant to legal issues or was conducted after
the judicial decision.24 For the research to be useful to the
lawmaker, it is necessary, as a preliminary, to determine how a
study relative to the Witherspoon issue of death-qualification might
be designed.
First, it would be necessary to identify a large number of poten-
tial jurors and reliably sort those jurors according to their attitudes
toward the death penalty. Next, those jurors would participate in a
real jury trial, involving a capital case, in which the evidence would
be sufficiently equivocal to allow attitudes toward the death penalty
to become part of the determination of guilt. At the trial's conclu-
sion, various panels consisting of twelve jurors would be formed.
Some panels would be comprised of death-qualified jurors by
Witherspoon standards, some panels would be comprised of WE ju-
rors, and some panels would be comprised of various combinations
of these groups. The relative tendency of these groups to convict or
acquit could then be assessed by comparing the proportion of cases
in which each type of jury returned verdicts of not guilty or guilty
(on various degrees of the offense).
In reality, such an ideal experiment could never be conducted
because compelling ethical and legal restraints protect the trial pro-
cess.2 5 In the absence of any kind of experimental evidence,
lawmakers would seem to be forced to rely on their best estimate of
the fireside induction. The ideal experiment can be approximated,
22. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
23. Tanke & Tanke, Getting Offa Slppery Slope.: Social Science in the Judicial Process,
34 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1130, 1133 (1979).
24. Id. This article discusses means by which data may be collected and presented in a
form suitable for judicial consideration.
25. Katz reports an effort by Strodtbeck to record surreptitiously actual jury delibera-
tions. The resulting controversy has effectively prevented further research of this nature. J.
KATz, EXPERIMENTATION wrrH HUMAN BEINGS: THE AUTHORITY OF THE INVESTIGATOR,
SUBJECT, PROFESSIONS AND STATE IN THE HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION PROCESS (1972).
[Vol. 5:1
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however, by the use of simulation. Assuming that the results ob-
tained with simulated juries are similar to the results that would
have been obtained with real juries, 26 what kind of effect would var-
ious experimental outcomes have on a lawmaker's decision?
Meehl 27 has addressed the general nature of the research-fire-
side induction relationship. He suggests that the most comfortable
situation occurs "when there is a sizable and consistent body of re-
search, experimental and nonexperimental (file data and field obser-
vation data), yielding about the same results as the fireside
inductions. ' 28 In this case, the congruence between behavioral sci-
ence research and the fireside induction would provide a consistent
basis for decisionmaking.
A slightly more difficult situation, according to Meehl, occurs
when "No quantitative or experimental evidence is available or
readily collectable before action must be taken. Here we rely upon
the fireside inductions, these being all we have." 29
The most difficult situations occur when the research results run
counter to the fireside induction. In cases of research-fireside induc-
tion conflicts, the research results will probably be regarded as un-
convincing counter-fireside induction evidence if the research
consists of (1) only a few isolated studies with weak effects,
(2) poorly designed studies in which internal validity is questiona-
ble, (3) studies conducted under conditions so artificial or remote
that generalization to actual situations may not be valid, or (4) a
collection of studies yielding inconsistent results. In research-fire-
side induction conflicts such as these, the lawmaker may be uncom-
fortable with a decision based on the fireside induction, but it is
reasonable to expect that the minimal research support will cause
the fireside induction to prevail.
Less difficult situations are encountered in those cases in which
the research evidence still conflicts with the fireside induction, but
the evidence is more convincing, e.g., the studies show stronger ef-
fects; there are no problems of internal or external validity; and/or
the studies produce consistent results. In such conflict situations the
strong research evidence should decrease the lawmaker's discom-
fort, and the research results could be expected to guide the
26. This assumption can be questioned. For a general discussion of the simulation
problem see Bermant, McGuire, McKinley, & Solo, The Logic of Simulation in Jury Re-
search, 1 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 224 (1974).
27. Meehl, supra note 1.




lawmaker's decision. The preceding discussion suggests a contin-
uum of potential dilemmas which may be introduced by research
which conflicts with the fireside induction.
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
The major empirical question is whether a jury formed under
Witherspoon standards is more likely to convict than a similar jury
which also includes WEs. The question can be addressed by com-
paring the guilt judgments rendered by Witherspoon-qualified jurors
with the guilt judgments made by WEs in cases involving the same
defendant.
Prior to a review of the most relevant studies, a set of three pre-
Witherspoon studies will be considered.30 Since all three studies
were conducted prior to establishment of the Witherspoon standard,
researchers asked whether a jury formed by excluding all subjects
having scruples about the death penalty was more likely to convict
than a jury comprised of subjects not having such scruples. The
comparative difference in conviction behavior between scrupled and
non-scrupled subjects, broadly defined, does not directly address the
Witherspoon issue since the scrupled group includes, from Table 1,
(1) the Witherspoon-qualified "oppose death penalty" subjects, and
(2) the two sub-groups which comprise the "automatic life-impris-
onment" group. These early studies are therefore of marginal rele-
vance to the empirical question derived from Witherspoon. They
are strongly relevant to the fireside induction, however.
A. Pre-Witherspoon Studies
The Wilson Study.31 Wilson administered a brief written
description of five criminal cases to 187 Texas college students and
61 college students in New York. At the same time, Wilson deter-
mined whether the students did or did not have scruples against
capital punishment. The students were then asked to render a deci-
sion of guilty or not guilty for each case. Since one of the cases
involved two defendants, the total number of guilty verdicts for any
given subject could range from zero to six. Table 2 illustrates Wil-
son's results.
The study revealed a systematic tendency for non-scrupled sub-










Scruples Against No Scruples Against
Death Penalty Death Penalty
5 - 6 17.0% 29.6%
3 - 4 61.3% 61.7%
0-2 21.7% 8.6%
jects to reach a guilty conclusion more often than scrupled subjects.
Almost 22% of the scrupled subjects voted guilty on two or fewer
occasions, compared with less than 9% of the non-scrupled subjects.
Only 17% of the scrupled subjects voted guilty in five or in all six
cases, while almost 30% of the non-scrupled subjects did so. These
differences would have occurred by chance less than 2% of the time.
The Wilson study was thus the first study to demonstrate that sub-
jects without scruples against the death penalty were more likely to
convict than subjects with scruples. The Wilson results support the
fireside induction.
Wilson also found that non-scrupled subjects were more confi-
dent in their decisions concerning guilt and that they assessed more
severe penalties. Further, the students expressed their agreement or
disagreement with fifteen statements measuring bias toward the
prosecution and bias against the insanity defense. The results
strongly suggested that non-scrupled subjects were biased in favor
of the prosecution and against the insanity defense.
One study is seldom definitive in resolving an empirical ques-
tion in behavioral science research, and the Wilson study is vulnera-
ble to several criticisms. In the first place, even though simulation
procedures have proven their scientific utility, there may be skepti-
cism about extrapolating from a situation involving brief written de-
scriptions of criminal cases to an actual capital case. Further, as one
wag has suggested, psychological science seems largely based on
data collected from white rats and college sophomores.32 While
Wilson's students would seem to be more like actual jurors than
32. Unfortunately, the original source of this suggestion is unknown.
1982]
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would rats, the extent to which students are representative of real
jurors is not known, even though many of Wilson's subjects may
have been members of the actual jury population. A third problem
to be noted is that Wilson's data seem most relevant to juror, not
jury, behavior. The student jurors simply indicated their guilt judg-
ments with no opportunity for group deliberation. This procedure
most closely resembles a first ballot in actual jury procedure. Fi-
nally, as previously noted, the broad comparison between scrupled
and non-scrupled subjects is not the appropriate comparison for the
issue raised by Witherspoon.
Wilson's results are nonetheless important as an empirical dem-
onstration of the link between attitude toward the death penalty and
(simulated) conviction behavior and as support for the fireside
induction.
The Goldberg Study.33 Goldberg independently conducted a
study very similar to Wilson's and reported similar results.
Goldberg asked 200 undergraduate students in Georgia whether
they had scruples against the death penalty. Sixty-one percent (122)
indicated they had such scruples. The remaining 39% (78) presuma-
bly answered that they had no such scruples. Each student-juror
judged the guilt or innocence of defendants in sixteen written de-
scriptions of criminal cases involving the death penalty. Each de-
fendant could be found guilty of first degree murder or guilty of a
lesser crime, or could be acquitted on the grounds of insanity or for
lack of evidence. If judged guilty, a sentence was assigned which
ranged in severity from probation to the death penalty. Goldberg
reported four primary comparisons between scrupled and non-scru-
pled subjects, which appear in Table 3.
All of the differences reported in Table 3 are in the same direc-
tion as Wilson's results and, as a consequence, provide further sup-
port for the developed view of the fireside induction. It should be
noted, however, that the conventional decision rule adopted by
Goldberg34 led to the conclusion that the observed difference in
guilty verdicts (and the difference between first degree murder ver-
dicts) between scrupled and non-scrupled subjects could reasonably
33. Supra note 15.
34. To determine whether the differences between the means of two groups are signifi-
cant, the threshold question to be resolved is whether the means of two groups differ only by
chance. In tests of other groups of scrupled and non-scrupled subjects, or in tests of Wilson's
and Goldberg's subjects a second time, the scores on the second test might not be the same
as those on the first-they might even be reversed. This occurrence would generate skepti-
[Vol. 5:1
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be attributed to chance rather than to attitude toward the death
penalty.35
TABLE 3
Percentage of Different Verdicts for Scrupled and Non-
scrupled Subjects
Subjects' Death-Penalty Attitude
Juror's Verdict Scruples Against No Scruples Against
Death Penalty Death Penalty
Guilty: Ist Degree Murder 44% 51%
Guilty: Lesser Offense 25% 24%
Not Guilty: Insanity 14% 9%
Not Guilty: Lack of 17% 14%
Evidence
Goldberg also reported important racial differences relative to
death penalty attitudes. Black respondents were more likely to op-
pose the death penalty (76%) than white respondents (47%). No sig-
cism about the significance of the differences, and the conclusion might be drawn that
whatever apparent differences existed were due merely to chance.
Statistical procedures are used which examine the hypothesis that there are no genuine
differences between the groups being tested (called the null hypothesis). The statistic yields
a numerical statement of the probabilities of any observed differences between groups being
the result of chance instead of the factors presumed to be causing them-in this case, atti-
tudes toward the death penalty.
Before the conclusion can be drawn that an observed difference is a genuine one and is
not due to chance, a probability value of 5% or .05 must be reached. The probability value
of .05 has, by convention, been adopted by researchers in the behavioral sciences as the
highest appropriate risk for concluding that the mean differences are genuine and are not
attributable to chance. For example, if the probability is higher than 5% that the results
would have occurred by chance, the researcher will conclude that chance can reasonably
account for the observed difference between groups. The researcher's decision might, of
course, be wrong, because he or she will erroneously conclude that real differences are due to
chance 5% of the time. (This failure to reject a null hypothesis which should be rejected is
called a Type I error. The erroneous conclusion that there is a genuine difference when the
differences are due to chance is called a Type II error). The 5% convention is, therefore,
simply an agreed-upon rule for decision based upon the relative consequences of making a
Type I, as opposed to Type II, error. In circumstances in which there is particular concern
about a Type II error, a probability level of .08, .10, or even .20 might be preferred. A
probability level higher than .05 would seem warranted when considering the studies re-
viewed here since judicial decisions based on their results may literally mean the difference
between life and death.
35. Goldberg, supra note 15, at 60-61.
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nificant differences in attitude were observed between male and
female respondents.
The same criticisms that applied to Wilson's study, and perhaps
other criticisms, apply to Goldberg's study. Again, the extent to
which the college students were representative of actual jurors is un-
known; the stimuli involved written case descriptions; there were no
deliberations of the kind engaged in by juries; and the comparison
was between broadly defined scrupled and non-scrupled subjects.
The significance of the last point is demonstrated by what
Goldberg regarded as a curious feature of her data. Fifty-two of her
scrupled subjects imposed one or more death sentences, a finding
which Goldberg regarded as inconsistent. These "inconsistent" sub-
jects can simply be regarded as samples from either or both of the
"oppose death penalty" or WE groups of Table 1. At the other end
of the death penalty continuum, five non-scrupled subjects were "in-
consistent" in imposing no death sentences. These "inconsistent"
subjects apparently belonged to either the "Indifferent" or "Favor
Death Penalty" groups.
Although it was available to the Witherspoon Court, the
Goldberg study is too seriously flawed to have contributed to the
Witherspoon decision other than as a "tentative and fragmentary"
study. The primary flaws derive from Goldberg's treatment of her
results. It would have been informative to have reported (as Wilson
did) the number of subjects in each group who convicted no defend-
ants, those who convicted only one defendant, and so on through
the maximum possible number of convictions (sixteen). The analy-
sis of data organized in this manner is relatively straightforward.
Goldberg did not present her results in this manner and it is not at
all clear how she analyzed the results she did report. There is a
distinct possibility that she used an inappropriate analysis and/or
made a serious computational error.36
In view of these important reservations, the prudent course is to
minimize the significance of the Goldberg results which directly
compare the conviction performance of scrupled and non-scrupled
subjects. Acknowledging the reservations, the data still permit the
statement that Goldberg's results are consistent with the fireside in-
36. Goldberg might have been expected to count each subject sixteen times, one time
for each case. This would generate 122 X 16 = 1952 votes. A chi-square analysis of such
total votes yields a significant result. However, Goldberg suggested that she utilized a chi-
square analysis and obtained p=.08, a result that was not significant. A chi-square analysis
is not appropriate to analyze the total voting frequencies because the votes are not independ-
ent, as chi square requires. The actual statistical procedure used by Goldberg is not clear.
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duction since the differences reported in Table 3 are in the same
direction as those of Wilson.
The common criticisms directed toward the Wilson and
Goldberg studies are fairly obvious ones growing out of the context
in which the research was conducted. Because of the ethical and
legal restraints which prohibit the study of actual jurors in actual
trials, it would seem that behavioral science research is limited to
offering only the most realistic simulation it can design. Surpris-
ingly, however, there is one study of actual scrupled and non-scru-
pled jurors which examined jurors' courtroom behavior in actual
trials. This unique study by Hans Zeisel was initially available to
the Witherspoon Court but was withdrawn prior to the Witherspoon
hearing because it had not been completed or analyzed.
The Zeisel Study. 7 Zeisel interviewed jurors who had partici-
pated in actual criminal cases and asked them three key questions
on the last day of their term of service:
1. Whether they had scruples against the death penalty.
2. How they voted on the first ballot after the jury began its
deliberations.
3. How the entire jury voted on the first ballot.
The survey results generated a "grab bag of Guilty and Not
Guilty votes on many different cases, where, most of the time, we
did not even have all twelve jurors from a particular case. . . . How
were we to compare a Guilty vote in a case where the jury voted
unanimously Guilty on the first ballot, with a Guilty vote that was
given on the first ballot in opposition to eleven jurors who voted for
acquittal?""a
Zeisel reasoned that the total number of guilty votes cast on the
first ballot indicates the general thrust of the evidence. Since
unanimous first-ballot votes did not reveal potential differences be-
tween scrupled and non-scrupled subjects, Zeisel analyzed the 464
split first-ballot votes. These 464 votes were grouped into "constel-
lations," according to whether they were given in a first ballot in
which there was only one vote for guilty, two votes for guilty, and so
forth, through eleven first-ballot votes for guilty. Figure 1 presents,
for each voting constellation, a comparison between the proportion
of jurors with and without scruples against the death penalty who
voted guilty on the first ballot.
37. Supra note 15.
38. Zeisel, supra note 15, at 28.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
FIRST BALLOT GUILTY VOTES (STRENGTH OF EVIOENCE)
Several observations are appropriate relative to Figure 1. First,
Zeisel's concept of the "strength of the evidence" seems to be sup-
ported. The proportion of subjects voting guilty, both scrupled and
non-scrupled, is functionally related to the number of first-ballot
guilty votes. Second, there is an interesting difference between the
proportion of scrupled and non-scrupled subjects voting guilty as a
function of the strength of the evidence. Non-scrupled subjects
reached the point of "equal-likelihood" of voting either guilty or not
guilty (p=.50) when the strength of the evidence yielded only four
first-ballot guilty votes, i e., when the evidence was relatively weak.
In contrast, scrupled subjects did not exceed the point of "equal-
likelihood" until there were eight first-ballot votes for guilty, ie.,
when the evidence was relatively strong. Finally, non-scrupled sub-
jects voted guilty more often than scrupled subjects ten times out of
the eleven possible comparisons. Had there been only chance differ-
ences between scrupled and non-scrupled subjects, then non-scru-
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pled subjects could be expected to convict more often than acquit in
ten or eleven of the comparisons fewer than six times in a thousand.
The chance odds of 172 to 1 against this rare event strongly suggest
that the differences observed by Zeisel represent real differences in
conviction behavior between the two groups and not simply chance
differences.39
Because it used actual jurors and actual trials, the Zeisel study
is an important demonstration that the differences between groups
in conviction behavior extend to actual situations and are not lim-
ited to simulations. An important reservation, of course, is that
Zeisel's scrupled and non-scrupled groups, like Goldberg's and Wil-
son's, were only broadly defined. This is hardly surprising since all
three studies were conducted prior to the Witherspoon decision and
could not have been expected to form their comparison groups on
the basis of Witherspoon criteria.
B. Post- Witherspoon Studies
The appropriate comparison groups for a study of the Wither-
spoon issue would involve a contrast between a group of subjects
death-qualified by Witherspoon standards and a group of subjects
who (1) indicated they would vote against the death penalty in
every capital case, regardless of the evidence, or (2) could not be
fair in judging a capital defendant's guilt or innocence. Three stud-
ies are now available which have attempted to reflect the appropri-
ate comparison groups.
The Jurow Study.' Jurow's subjects consisted of 211 industrial
workers roughly comparable to many actual juror pools. New York
judges responsible for court administration refused Jurow permis-
sion to use prospective jurors. Nevertheless, one-third of the 211
subjects had previously participated in jury service. The use of a
nonstudent subject pool diminishes the critical issue of the represen-
tativeness of the subject group associated with the earlier Wilson
and Goldberg studies.
39. Figure 1 is adapted from Zeisel's Table 9. The percentages reported by Zeisel for
each voting constellation were first converted to raw frequencies and the "unknown" votes
were eliminated. Then, for each constellation, the number of scrupled subjects who actually
voted guilty was expressed as a percentage of the total number voting either guilty or not
guilty. The same procedure was followed to determine the percentage of non-scrupled sub-
jects who voted guilty.
40. Jurow, New Data on the Effect ofa "Death-Qualfed" Jury on the Guilt Determination
Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 567 (1971).
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Each subject was administered the two-part Capital Punish-
ment Attitude Questionnaire (CPAQ), developed by Jurow to assess
general attitudes toward capital punishment and, in part B, to assess
how the subject would consider the death penalty if serving on a
jury. The CPAQ-B is directly relevant to the Witherspoon question
because subjects responding to statement-one on the scale were
identified as belonging to that Witherspoon-excludable category of
subjects who indicated they would always vote against the death
penalty, regardless of the evidence. No questions were asked about
whether the subjects could or could not be fair in judging a capital
defendant's guilt or innocence. The Witherspoon-relevant CPAQ-B
is reproduced below as Table 4 and also includes the distribution of
subjects endorsing each alternative.
TABLE 4
Capital Punishment Attitude Questionnaire (CPAQ),
Part B, and percentage distribution of subjects
endorsing each alternative.
Percentage Assume you are on a jury to determine the sentence for a
Choosing defendant who has already been convicted of a very serious
crime. If the law gives you a choice of death or life imprison-
ment or some other penalty: (Circle only one)
10% 1. I could not vote for the death penalty regardless of the
facts and circumstances of the case.
20% 2. There are some kinds of cases in which I know I could
not vote for the death penalty even if the law allowed me
to, but others in which I would be willing to consider
voting for it.
63% 3. I would consider all of the penalties provided by the law
and the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
5% 4. I would usually vote for the death penalty in a case
where the law allows me to.
2% 5. I would always vote for the death penalty in a case where
the law allows me to.
After completing the CPAQ and several other attitude scales,4'
41. The other scales administered by Jurow were the Thurstone Capital Punishment
Attitude Scale, the Conservatism-Liberalism Scale, the California F Scale, the Legal Atti-
tudes Questionnaire, the Average Penalty Scale, and the Death Penalty Scale.
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Jurow's subjects listened to two audiotapes of simulated criminal
trials, including abbreviated opening statements, examination of
witnesses, closing arguments, and the judge's instructions to the
jury. The first thirty-three minute tape involved the murder of a
liquor store proprietor during a holdup, and the second fifty minute
tape involved a narcotics addict charged with robbing, raping, and
killing a girl in her apartment.
After listening to the tapes, subjects considered their verdict
and voted guilty or not guilty. The relationship between judgments
of guilt and the endorsed CPAQ-B item are reproduced in Table 5.
Table 5 also reports, for each group, whether the direction of the




CPAQ-B Number Number Within-Group
Statement voting voting Majority
Endorsed Guilty Innocent Vote
Case I
1 7 14 67% Acquit
2 12 30 71% Acquit
3 59 73 55% Acquit
4 10 1 91% Convict
5 4 1 80% Convict
Case II
1 9 12 57% Acquit
2 25 17 60% Convict
3 76 56 57% Convict
4 9 2 82% Convict
5 4 1 80% Convict
The two cases were not equally likely to generate guilty judg-
ments. The average judgment of the first case was not guilty, a judg-
ment made by 56.4% of the subjects. The average judgment of the
second case was guilty, a judgment made in 58.3% of the cases. Both
cases thus seem to be relatively equivocal in evoking judgments of
guilt or innocence, one criterion developed earlier to characterize an
"ideal" study. Had they been ideal, both of Jurow's cases would
have produced a three-two or two-three majority-vote split among
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the five groups. The four-one split for conviction in Case II suggests
that the "strength of the evidence" in Case II may have been too
strong to permit detection of potential group differences.
For Case I, the vote to convict or acquit was systematically re-
lated to the subject's attitude toward the death penalty. Subjects en-
dorsing CPAQ-B statements one, two, and three42 were more likely
to acquit than convict; subjects endorsing statements four and five
43
favoring the death penalty were more likely to convict.
These same data can be examined in a slightly different way. If
the average value of the CPAQ-B endorsed by subjects who con-
victed is compared to the average value endorsed by subjects who
acquitted, the result is that subjects who convicted in Case I scored
significantly higher in the direction of favoring the death penalty on
the CPAQ-B than subjects who acquitted.44
For Case II, the results were in the same direction as in Case I,
as evidenced by the changing percentage of particular CPAQ-B
groups who voted guilty. An overall analysis of these differences
was not significant, which suggests only a chance relationship be-
tween death-penalty attitude and conviction behavior for Case II.
However, the average CPAQ-B item endorsed by those convicting
in Case II was significantly higher than it was for those acquitting.45
The discrepancy between the conclusions from these two measures
may derive from a combination of (1) the relatively low frequencies
in groups one, four, and five, (2) the relative insensitivity of Case II
as a measuring device because of the strength of the evidence, and
(3) the shift toward guilty judgments from Case I to Case II for
CPAQ-B groups two and three.
With respect to the third possibility above, Jurow actually ex-
amined the shift in voting patterns between Case I and Case II. He
42. Supra Table 4.
43. Id.
44. The obtained value of t was 3.36. If the statistical test inquires whether the groups
were different, it is a non-directional test and, in this case, I would be associated with a
critical value of 1.97. On the other hand, if the statistical question specifies in advance that
one particular group should score higher than the other (as all these studies do), then a
directional test may be appropriate. In this case, the critical value of I for a directional test is
1.65. Since the obtained t of 3.36 exceeded both critical values, the directional and non-
directional tests lead to the same conclusion.
45. The obtained value of t was 1.86 which is less than the critical value of 1.97 associ-
ated with a non-directional test (supra note 44). This comparison led Jurow to conclude that
there was no significant difference in the average CPAQ-B item endorsed by those convict-
ing or acquitting in Case II. The author's conclusion that Jurow's results demonstrate a
significant difference is based on the observation that the obtained t of 1.86 exceeds the
critical value of 1.65 associated with a directional test.
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noted that "groups one, four, and five are relatively constant in their
voting behavior, the former [sic] constantly voting to acquit and the
latter two to convict. Whatever flexibility in voting behavior is ex-
hibited by the subjects comes largely from groups two and three.
'
"46
The methodological criticisms applicable to the Goldberg and
Wilson studies are diminished in the Jurow study. While it is true
that Jurow studied juror behavior, and not jury behavior, he used
Witherspoon -relevant groups, used more realistic audiotaped simu-
lation materials, and his subjects approximated the characteristics of
real jurors. Nevertheless, Jurow obtained results consistent with
those of prior studies. In short, Jurow's results support the conclu-
sion that the results reported in the pre-Witherspoon studies oc-
curred in spite of, and not because of, methodological limitations.
The Harris Study.47 White4 ' reported a Harris poll in which
2068 adults, a stratified sample of the United States, were asked
whether, in a murder trial, "there would be any situation in which
you might vote for the death penalty, or do you think you could
never vote for the death penalty, regardless of the circumstances?
49
Responses to this question identified the same comparison groups as
those investigated by Jurow.
Each subject-juror was instructed about such legal principles as
reasonable doubt and the prosecutor's burden of proof, after which
they were given written descriptions of four criminal cases. The
type of case and the percentage of each group voting guilty appears
in Table 6. In the first three cases, the results were regarded as sta-
tistically significant in that each of the observed differences would
have arisen by chance fewer than one time in a thousand. In the
fourth case, the observed difference was in the expected direction
but, because there was a one in ten possibility that such a difference
might be due to chance, the results were not regarded as statistically
significant. In three of the four cases, therefore, the results were
highly reliable in demonstrating that subjects who could never vote
for the death penalty voted to convict less often than death-qualified
jurors. Thus, the fireside induction is again supported, this time
with a national sample of subjects in which the comparison groups
were distinguished on the basis of relevant Witherspoon criteria.
46. Jurow, supra note 40, at 583-84.
47. L. Harris & Assoc., Inc., Study No. 2016 (1971).
48. White, The Constitutional Invalidiy of Convictions Imposed by Death-Qual,ed Ju-
ries, 58 CORN. L. REv. 1176, 1178 n.12, 1185 (1973).
49. Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal.3d 1, 37, 616 P.2d 1301, 1322, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128,
149 (1980) (quoting the precise language used in the Harris Study).
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However, like the previous studies, the results of jury deliberations
were not investigated.
TABLE 6
Percentage of Guilty Verdicts in Four Cases by
Witherspoon -Excludable and Witherspoon-
Qualified Subjects
Classification by Death-Penalty Attitude
Case
Witherspoon -Excludable Witherspoon-Qualified
Typewriter Robbery 57% 66%
Manslaughter 67% 74%
Assault of Officer 32% 39%
Automobile Larceny 69% 73%
The methodological improvements associated with the Jurow
results and with the Harris results make the research results consid-
erably less "tentative and fragmentary" than was the evidence at the
time of the Witherspoon hearing. Even so, a major remaining reser-
vation may be expressed relative to the composition of the group
defined as Witherspoon-Excludable in both the Jurow study and in
the Harris study. In both cases the identified WEs were relevant to
the first exclusionary criterion because the WE subjects indicated
they would vote against the death penalty in every capital case, re-
gardless of the evidence. The current issue, however, turns on the
second criterion: the exclusion of subjects adamantly opposed to the
death penalty who could not be fair in judging a capital defendant's
guilt or innocence.
A legitimate reservation, therefore, is that the WE groups used
in the Jurow and Harris studies may have included Nullifiers and
are thus too inclusive to indicate whether a subset of WEs, described
earlier as Guilt Phase Includables, differ in conviction behavior
from those who are death-qualified by Witherspoon standards.
The kind of study needed is one involving a realistic simulation
in which the conviction performance of Witherspoon -qualified jury-
eligible subjects is compared with WEs, excluding Nullifiers. Ide-
ally, the study would examine jury performance in addition to juror
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behavior. Precisely such a study was recently completed by Phoebe
Ellsworth and her associates.
The Ellsworth, Thompson, and Cowan Study.50 Ellsworth elimi-
nated the Nullifiers from a sample of jury-eligible adults in Califor-
nia by asking two basic questions. The first question asked whether
potential subject-jurors would or would not consider voting to im-
pose the death penalty in at least some capital cases. A second ques-
tion asked whether, in the guilt phase of a trial, the subjects would
"(a) ...decide the question of guilt or innocence in a fair and im-
partial manner based on the evidence and the law, or (b) ...not
be fair and impartial in deciding the question of guilt or innocence,
knowing that if the person was convicted he or she might get the
death penalty.
51
Subjects choosing alternative (b) were identified as Nullifiers
and eliminated from the experiment. Subjects who expressed ada-
mant opposition to the death penalty but who also selected alterna-
tive (a) were identified as (Guilt Phase Includable) WEs. The final
sample consisted of 258 death-qualified subjects and 30 WEs, a total
of 288 (of whom 45% had experienced prior jury service).
TABLE 7
Percentage of Witherspoon -Excludable and Witherspoon-
Qualified Subjects Voting for Various Verdicts
Classification by Death-Penalty Attitude
Verdict
Witherspoon -Excludable Witherspoon -Qualified
1st Degree Murder 3.3% 7.8%
2nd Degree Murder 23.3% 21.3%
Manslaughter 26.7% 48.9%
Acquittal 46.7% 22.1%
The subjects were then shown, in groups ranging in size from
12 to 36, a two-and-one-half hour scripted, videotaped reenactment
of an actual criminal trial, regarded in pretesting as convincing and
50. Ellsworth, Thompson, & Cowan, Juror Attitudes and Conviction Proneness: The Re-
lationshi Between 4ttitudes Toward the Death Penalty and Predisposition to Convict (unpub-





realistic. After viewing the videotape, each subject voted for a ver-
dict of either not guilty, or guilty of first degree murder, second de-
gree murder, or voluntary manslaughter. The results appear in
Table 7. The pattern of results appearing in Table 7 could have
arisen by chance fewer than one time in a hundred. The results,
therefore, are significant and demonstrate that subjects who were
death-qualified by Witherspoon standards were more likely to con-
vict than subjects who would never vote for the death penalty, but
who could be fair and impartial at the guilt phase of a trial.
After recording their individual decisions on the issue of guilt,
most of the subjects were divided into twelve-person juries and al-
lowed to deliberate. Some juries were composed exclusively of
Witherspoon-qualified jurors while some were a mixture of Wither-
spoon -qualified jurors and (up to four) WEs. Although instructed
to try to reach a unanimous verdict, no jury had reached a verdict
after one hour of deliberation. Deliberations were then stopped and
personal verdicts were again recorded. The results appear in Table
8.
TABLE 8
Percentage of Witherspoon -Excludable and Witherspoon-
Qualified Subjects Voting for Various Post-
deliberation Verdicts
Classification by Death-Penalty Attitude
Verdict
Witherspoon -Excludable Witherspoon -Qualified
1st Degree Murder 3.4% 1.0%
2nd Degree Murder 13.8% 17.3%
Manslaughter 48.3% 68.0%
Acquittal 34.5% 13.7%
Of those subjects who deliberated, there was an unexplained
loss of sixty-one subjects from the Witherspoon-qualified group and
one subject from the WE group. No information is available on the
original votes of these "lost" subjects, and no information is avail-
able on the overall pattern of voting shifts. The results in Table 8
are, therefore, best viewed independently of the data appearing in
Table 7. An analysis of the data appearing in Table 8 demonstrates
that the observed pattern of voting differences between the two
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groups would have occurred by chance less than 5% of the time and
so indicates a systematic voting difference. The same pattern of re-
sults observed as juror behavior before deliberation was also ob-
served afterjury deliberation. It would thus appear that the similar
patterns of predeliberation results observed in the earlier studies
were differences that would also characterize jury, as well as juror,
behavior.
The six reviewed studies, along with the fireside induction,
form a collective "package" with consistent, convergent results.52
There is a conspicuous absence of studies reporting contrary results
or even conditions limiting the effect of death-penalty attitudes on
conviction behavior. A contemporary lawmaker, relying on a judi-
cious mixture of research and the fireside induction, might find that
the package provided convincing evidence that there are real differ-
ences between WEs and Witherspoon-qualified jurors in their will-
ingness to convict.
C. The ADP Issue
In Hovey v. Superior Court53 California lawmakers found the
package convincing relative to the Witherspoon issue, but not rele-
vant to death-qualification as practiced in California. California
provides for the exclusion of not only those who, under Wither-
spoon, would never vote for the death penalty, but also for the ex-
clusion of those jurors who would always vote for the death penalty.
This group corresponds to the Automatic Death Penalty (ADP)
group at the extreme left of Table 1. The conclusion in Hovey was
that studies relevant to California procedure would compare a com-
bined group of California excludable subjects (WEs and ADPs)
with California death-qualified subjects. The current package
therefore consisted of studies which provided convincing evidence
of an irrelevant issue.54
In Grigsby v. Mabry" the State of Arkansas also contended that
52. The "package" actually includes numerous additional studies demonstrating other
attitudes correlated with death-penalty attitude, survey results demonstrating that blacks
and females are more likely to oppose the death penalty and thus are more likely to be
excluded than whites and males, and a study demonstrating that the death qualification
process itself increases the probability of conviction.
53. 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980).
54. Id. at 68, 616 P.2d at 1346, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
55. Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Ark.) modoed, reh'g granted, 637 F.2d
525 (8th Cir. 1980).
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the reviewed studies proved the "wrong" hypothesis. The state al-
leged that Arkansas, like California, eliminates both ADPs as well
as WEs from capital cases. This exclusion of ADPs casts doubt on
the generalizability of any study which fails to identify ADPs and
classify them with the other excludables.
In Hovey, the defense contended that the size of the ADP group
was disproportionately small relative to the size of the WE group. If
such were the case, then the subtraction of a few ADP jurors from
the large class of Witherspoon-qualified jurors would be of little con-
sequence to the results of the reviewed studies. The Hovey court,
however, had no reliable basis from which the relative size of the
ADP group could be estimated; tentative indications were that it
"may be as small as 1 percent (or less) of the adult population or as
large as 28 percent."56 In the absence of information concerning the
size and voting performance of the ADP group, the Hovey court
concluded that there was not enough evidence to support a constitu-
tional decision.
After Hovey, it was not clear whether death-qualification by ex-
cluding both WEs and ADPs resulted in a disadvantage to the de-
fendant. Whether the exclusion does disadvantage the defendant
obviously depends on the relative distribution of WEs and ADPs. If
the number of WEs is disproportionately large relative to ADPs,
then a jury formed by excluding a large number of WEs and only a
few ADPs would operate to the disadvantage of the defendant. It
would result in a jury prone to convict, like those described in the
six reviewed studies. The State of Arkansas introduced a study in
Grigsby, however, which suggested that the size of the ADP group
was not trivial, but substantial.
The Shure Study." Shure conducted a telephone survey of an
area around West Los Angeles. The jury-eligible status of the re-
spondents is unknown but a small percentage (3%) of the 369 re-
spondents were reported to have experienced prior jury service. On
the basis of responses to Witherspoon questions developed and used
by Ellsworth, Shure initially classified 310 of his respondents as
death-qualified and 59 as WEs. On the basis of further questions,
the respondents were reclassified. A central question was whether
the respondent would vote for the death penalty in a specific case, a
question apparently adapted from Jurow's Case I but much more
56. 28 Cal. 3d at 65, 616 P.2d at 1344, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 171.




heinous. The case involved a drug addict who allegedly broke into
an apartment where a young college girl and her boyfriend were
studying. The boyfriend was shot to death and the girl was raped
and shot in the head five times. She survived but was left paralyzed,
mute, and partially blind. Based primarily on their response to this
case, respondents were reclassified. The reclassified sample was
comprised of 84 WEs (22.76%), 123 ADPs (33.33%), and 162 (43.9%)
death-qualified by California standards.
If Shure's data are representative, the relative size of the ADP
group is substantial and the State's (Arkansas') argument should be
seriously considered. Shure's procedure, however, may have been
seriously flawed. For example, ADPs were identified according to
whether they would vote for the death penalty in a specific, atro-
cious case rather than whether they would always vote for the death
penalty. Further, the results of other studies suggest that Shure's
results are not at all representative and that the ADP population is
relatively small.
The Jurow Study.58 The CPAQ-B administered by Jurow and
the distribution of responses which appears in Table 4 should be
compared with Shure's results. Statement five of the CPAQ-B is an
ADP question which was endorsed by only 2% of Jurow's sample, a
result in marked contrast to the 33% reported by Shure.
The Hamilton Study.59 Hamilton administered the CPAQ to
167 university students in New York. The distribution of responses
to the CPAQ-B were that 35% of the respondents were classified as
WE, 64% were death-qualified by California standards and only 1%
were ADPs. The Hamilton results, like those of Jurow, indicate that
the ADP population is extremely small both in an absolute sense
and relative to the WE population.
The Berry and Butler Study. 60 Berry and Butler administered
the CPAQ to a sample of 91 subjects in Arkansas, consisting of em-
ployees of Teletype Corporation, the U.S. Corps of Engineers, and
adult students at the University of Arkansas. More than one-half of
58. Supra note 40.
59. Hamilton, Individual DiOferences in Ascriptions of Responsibility, Guilt, and Appropri-
ate Punishment, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW (G. Bermant, C. Nemeth, & N. Vidmar eds.
1976).
60. Berry & Butler, Distributions of Death-Penally Attitudes: An Arkansas Sample (Uni-
versity of Arkansas at Little Rock, 1981) (unpublished manuscript).
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this sample was eligible for jury service. The distribution of re-
sponses to the CPAQ-B was such that 10% were classified as WE by
endorsing statement one, 88% were death-qualified by California
standards, and only 1% were classified as ADP. Again, the results
indicate that the size of the ADP group is negligible.
The 1981 Harris Study."' A national telephone poll was con-
ducted by the Harris organization in January 1981. The sample
consisted of 1499 adults from 100 clustered telephone exchanges,
stratified by geographic region and metropolitan/non-metropolitan
residence. Respondents were first asked a question about their gen-
eral views on capital punishment. The 256 who reported that they
strongly favored the death penalty were then asked whether they
could be fair and impartial in determining guilt or innocence in a
capital case. The 213 who said they could be fair were then asked
the final ADP-defining question of whether they could always vote
to impose the death penalty. Thirteen respondents indicated they
would always vote for death, hence thirteen subjects from the na-
tional sample of 1499 were classified as belonging to the ADP
group. After standard weighting procedures were applied, the data
revealed that ADP classification defines less than 1% of the adult
American population.
The Cowan and Thompson Study.62 Cowan and Thompson
conducted telephone interviews with ninety-nine subjects randomly
selected from the jury rolls in Santa Clara County, California. In
response to a question concerning their general attitude toward the
death penalty, nine subjects reported they strongly favored it. None
of the nine, however, indicated that they would always vote for the
death penalty in a capital case. Cowan and Thompson were thus
unable to locate any ADPs for their proposed experiment on ADP
behavior, which led them to abandon their experiment as "impracti-
cable" given the low frequency of ADPs.
The Arkansas Archival Study.63 A more direct approach to the
ADP question is to examine actual capital cases and count the
number of potential jurors who have been excluded on the basis of
61. L. Harris & Assoc. Inc., Study No. 814002 (January 1981).
62. Cowan & Thompson, Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness: The Auto-
matic Death Penalty Juror (Stanford University, 1981) (unpublished manuscript).




identification with either the WE or ADP groups. Such a direct
study was conducted in Arkansas for all capital cases since 1973,
which includes the years in which the present Arkansas death-pen-
alty statute has been in effect. Researchers identified a total of forty-
six capital murder cases in which the voir dire was transcribed. Of
the 2142 jurors involved in these cases, 284 (13.25%) were excluded
as WEs while only 11 (0.51%) were excluded as ADPs.
It is possible, of course, that defense attorneys simply failed to
capitalize on their privilege to ask questions during the voir dire
which might lead to the elimination of ADPs. Accordingly, the Ar-
kansas Archival Study also examined the distribution of excluded
WEs and ADPs in only those cases in which ADP questions were, in
fact, asked. The total number of jurors involved in voir dires meet-
ing this more stringent criterion was 1557 with the eleven excluded
ADPs constituting 0.70% of this total. In terms of actual Arkansas
practice, therefore, ADPs comprise less than one percent of the ex-
cluded juror population, a result which accords with all other at-
tempts to estimate the size of the ADP group, with the single
exception of the Shure study.
The discrepancy between the estimate of the ADP population
provided by the Shure results and the estimates provided by the re-
maining studies is presently unexplained. One possibility that rea-
sonably could have contributed to the discrepancy has already been
outlined: Shure's use of a specific case to identify ADPs.
It is also possible that one or more of the samples were not
representative. Since several studies suggested a small ADP popula-
tion, including the well-conducted national survey by Harris, the
probability is that if any study used a nonrepresentative sample, it
was the Shure study. This would seem especially probable given
that the West Los Angeles area sampled by Shure included such
nonrepresentative communities as Bel Air, Beverly Hills, and
Westwood.
At least, the size of the ADP group appears smaller than the
size of the WE group. A conservative measure of the difference in
group size may be extrapolated from the empirical data compiled by
the Arkansas Archival Study in which ADP questions were actually
asked. The size of the WE percentage (10.7) was fifteen times as
large as the size of the ADP percentage (0.7). With a jury of twelve,
the probability of selecting at least one WE is .74 and the
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probability of selecting at least one ADP is .028.6 In Arkansas,
therefore, between 1973 and 1981, the conservative chance of en-
countering a WE in a jury of twelve was twenty-seven times more
likely than the chance of encountering an ADP. It therefore seems
that the apparent neutrality afforded a defendant by the disqualifi-
cation of potential jurors on the basis of either their adamant sup-
port of, or adamant opposition to, the death penalty, is only an
appearance of neutrality. In fact, the defendant is disadvantaged.
THE FIRESIDE REVISITED
When the fireside induction was originally discussed, vigorous
opposition from prosecutors suggested the possibility of a counter-
vailing induction. In this context, there is one observation concern-
ing the ADP issue which should not go unnoticed. The entire thrust
of the state's ADP argument is based on the assumption that ADPs
are conviction-prone and WEs are acquittal-prone. This means that
the state's ADP argument affirms the fireside induction of a system-
atic relationship between death-penalty attitude and willingness to
convict. This development is not altogether surprising since, on
other occasions, the prosecution's acknowledgment of the induction
is even more explicit. For example, in People v. Ray,65 the prosecu-
tion argued that the inclusion of jurors who opposed the death pen-
alty would lead to an acquittal-prone jury, Le., the fireside induction
was used to support the prosecution's argument for the continued
exclusion of WEs. A similar argument was presented in Spinkellink
v. Wainwright.6 Another justification for attributing a belief in the
fireside induction to the prosecution is the not uncommon
prosecutorial strategy of seeking a more favorable "death-qualified"
jury by eliminating WEs and, following conviction at the guilt-
phase, of waiving the death penalty. For example, this pattern of
death-qualification followed by post-conviction waiver of the death
penalty occurred in the Grigsby case and raises the question whether
the waiver was motivated by a post-conviction impulse of compas-
sion or, as seems more likely, reflected a strategy designed to in-
crease the probability of conviction at the guilt phase.
It thus appears that the state is aligned with the defense in en-
64. The probability value of .74 was obtained from (1 - (100 - 10.7)12). The value of
.028 was obtained from (1 - (100 - .7)12).
65. 252 Cal. App. 2d 932, 948, 61 Cal. Rptr. 1, 10 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 864
(1968).
66. 578 F.2d 582, 596 (5th Cir. 1978).
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dorsing the fireside induction! An alternative, but simultaneous,
prosecution strategy used both in Hovey and in Grigsby is that of
denying the fireside induction by challenging the validity of the re-
search studies. In effect, this denial asserts the countervailing induc-
tion that death penalty attitude is not related to a juror's willingness
to convict.
The challenge involves a recitation of the methodological
problems associated with each study. The primary criticisms are
those outlined earlier,67 e.g., the use of college students' responses to
written case materials. Legitimate criticisms can be directed toward
any one study, particularly the pre-Witherspoon studies of Wilson
and Goldberg. Criticisms of the "package" are somewhat strained
since the studies consistently report the same effects using (1) differ-
ent cases in different locales; (2) college students (Wilson;
Goldberg), approximations to real jurors (Jurow), jury-eligible sub-
jects (Ellsworth), or real jurors (Zeisel); (3) written cases (Wilson;
Goldberg), audiotapes (Jurow), videotapes (Ellsworth), or actual ju-
rors (Zeisel); (4) subjects with broadly defined scruples (Wilson;
Goldberg; Zeisel) or precisely defined Witherspoon criteria (Jurow;
Harris; Ellsworth); and (5) non-deliberating jurors (all studies) or
jury deliberations (Zeisel; Ellsworth).
The state's challenge to the research has been directed prima-
67. The critic's assumption seems to be that a jury trial defines the standard of truth and
justice, whereas a simulation would not. The validity of a simulation is believed to depend
on the congruence between simulation conditions and a jury trial. However, there are nu-
merous kinds of artificial realities. The critics appear to be asking for what systems theorists
describe as a replication, an artificial reality with a high degree of structural resemblance to
the object or system being modeled. In the view of a systems theorist, a simulation depends
less on structural resemblance than on functional resemblance, Z e., the useful equivalence of
its conditions to those of the object being modeled. The important question, therefore, is
whether the reviewed studies measure the functional relation between death penalty attitude
and tendency to convict.
It is conceivable that use of written materials as a stimulus may provide greater func-
tional resemblance than either audiotapes or videotapes. Written materials demand the at-
tention of the subject, while audiotaped or videotaped materials do not--the subject may be
inattentive or even bored. In this context, an experiment by Bermant and others (Supra note
26) is suggestive. Bermant presented four groups of subjects with different amounts of infor-
mation about an actual Detroit murder trial that ended with a verdict of manslaughter. The
four groups received information in decreasing degrees of structural resemblance to an ac-
tual jury trial. The maximum verisimilitude involved a fifty-minute automated slide show
of people in the courtroom acting the roles of judge, prosecutor, etc. Subjects in the mini-
mum condition of verisimilitude received only a four-page summary of the evidence and the
judge's instructions. Paradoxically, the greater the degree of structural resemblance, the less
well the results resembled the manslaughter conviction in the actual trial. The conviction
rate was highest in the group that had the four-page summary while the groups with the
most information had the highest proportion of votes for acquittal.
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rily at the external validity (the generalizability to actual jury situa-
tions), and not at the internal validity (that the differences in
conviction behavior derive from differences in death-penalty atti-
tudes) of the results. The question of external validity can never be
answered to the critic's satisfaction, of course, since the ideal experi-
ment cannot be performed, and the critics decline to offer any satis-
factory, alternative experimental design. In the absence of exacting,
impossible standards of scientific proof, most lawmakers will recog-
nize that the Zeisel study and the three post- Witherspoon experi-
ments obviously constitute more than a simple replication of the
earlier results-they significantly extend external validity. In the
absence of any serious challenge to internal validity, the studies pro-
vide convincing support for the fireside induction.
It is nonetheless interesting to explore the implications of the
countervailing induction to determine the consequences to a defend-
ant if there are no differences in the willingness to convict of Wither-
spoon-qualified and WE jurors. Consider the decision-making
process confronting a jury as illustrated in Table 9. The columns
describe the actual, but unknown, facts concerning the guilt or inno-
cence of the defendant. The left column describes the condition of
an innocent defendant or a defendant whose guilt is reasonably
doubted. The right column describes a defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. The question for the jury is whether the defend-
ant is guilty and should be convicted, or whether the defendant
should be acquitted as innocent. The decision to convict or acquit is
described by the rows in Table 9.
TABLE 9
Decision Matrix: Varieties of Errors
and Correct Decisions
Actual Condition of Defendant
Jury's Verdict
Innocent Guilty
Convict Harsh Error Correct Decision
Acquit Correct Decision Lenient Error
A correct decision can be reached in two possible ways. A cor-
rect decision includes, as possibilities, either the conviction of a
guilty defendant or the acquittal of an innocent defendant. Simi-
68. Supra note 15.
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larly, there are two possible ways to reach an erroneous decision:
the conviction of an innocent defendant (a harsh error) or the ac-
quittal of a defendant who is guilty (a lenient error). The purpose of
a jury trial is realization of the goal of the criminal justice system,
ie., reaching a correct decision and avoiding both errors. The risk
of either type of error depends on the criterion the juror uses to
determine what constitutes reasonable doubt. The dilemma is that
any change in the juror's criterion which minimizes harsh error will
lead to an increase in lenient error and vice-versa. In adopting a
criterion for decision, the costs associated with each type of error
must be considered. The costs associated with the two types of error
are not equivalent-a harsh error is much more serious.
A comparison of the effects on the different error rates, given
juries which include WEs under the assumption of either the fireside
or the countervailing induction, should be instructive. First assume
the fireside induction. If WEs are more likely to acquit in equivocal
cases, then the effect of including them in capital cases will be that
(1) fewer guilty defendants will correctly be convicted, ie., an in-
crease in lenient error can be anticipated, and (2) more innocent
defendants will correctly be acquitted, i e., a decrease in harsh error
can be anticipated. Under the fireside induction, the inclusion of
currently excluded WEs would decrease harsh errors. Under the
presumption of innocence, it is precisely toward minimizing harsh
error that the principles of the Constitution are directed.
Under the countervailing induction, if there are no differences
between WEs and Witherspoon -qualified jurors in their willingness
to convict, then the inclusion of WEs will have absolutely no effect
on either correct decision, or harsh error or lenient error. If there
were really no differences, then the procedure of asking about ju-
rors' attitudes toward the death penalty during the voir dire makes
no sense, because it would be of no significance in the outcome of
the guilt phase of a trial. Under the countervailing induction, the
state would have no interest in excluding jurors on the basis of
death-qualification except for the inconvenience and/or cost associ-
ated with the inclusion of WEs at the guilt phase of a trial. One
potential solution would be to require bifurcated guilt-sentencing
proceedings using independent juries. The increased inconvenience
and cost resulting from such a solution might be used to argue that
the state's interest in saving time and/or money outweighs the de-
fendant's interest in an impartial trial. In the current death-qualifi-
cation case of Grigsby v. Mabry, however, this argument was not
1982]
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introduced. Indeed, no evidence was introduced regarding the
value of death qualification to the state. It therefore seems unlikely
that the state genuinely believes that attitude toward the death pen-
alty and tendency to convict are independent. This revisit to the
fireside suggests that the state has adopted the inconsistent posture
of affirming the fireside induction with the ADP issue and simulta-
neously denying the induction by challenging the validity of the re-
search studies. The goal, continued exclusion of WEs from jury
trials, is the thread of consistency which unites the state's seemingly
inconsistent positions.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
It has been argued that the effect of the exclusion of jurors
under the Witherspoon standard ranges from no effect under the
countervailing induction to a clear disadvantage to the defendant
under the fireside induction. It has also been argued that the weight
of the evidence indicates that potential jurors excludable under
Witherspoon differ in their tendency to convict from those who
could participate as jurors under Witherspoon. Most observers
would probably agree that additional research would not be likely
to result in serious modification of the basic experimental findings.
There would be some interest in discovering limiting conditions to
the observed differences, but the major contemporary interest has
shifted to research designed to understand potential theoretical
mechanisms responsible for the observed effects of death penalty
attitudes.
One possible mechanism was suggested by Jurow. Jurow theo-
rized that the distinction between conviction-prone and acquittal-
prone jurors corresponded to Packer's distinction between a "due
process model" and a "crime-control model" of the criminal pro-
cess.6 9 In the "due process model,"
[T]he defendant is considered guilty if, and only if, the state
meets proper procedural requirements from the moment it com-
mences the criminal process. Thus, under certain circumstances,
a defendant cannot be found guilty no matter how clear it may be
that he committed the crime if, for example, illegally obtained
evidence is used at his trial, or if he confessed without first being
advised of his right to remain silent. °
The "crime-control model," in contrast, "focuses on apprehending
69. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. I (1964).
70. Jurow, supra note 40, at 595.
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and convicting the maximum number of criminals. The emphasis is
on 'factual guilt' in the sense that due process procedural require-
ments are viewed as 'niceties' or 'obstacles' that often hamper law
enforcement personnel in arresting and convicting the 'obviously
guilty.' ,71
In addition to the studies reviewed here, several other studies,
including numerous attitude surveys, were introduced in Grigsby v.
Mabry. 72 Two of these are briefly described because they represent
the manner in which WEs and Witherspoon -qualified subjects estab-
lish criteria for making decisions relative to Table 9.
The Ellsworth and Fitzgerald Study.73 Ellsworth and Fitzgerald
surveyed 123 WEs (actually guilt-phase includable) and 594 Wither-
spoon-qualified subjects, randomly selected from jury-eligible sub-
jects in Alameda County, California. Table 10 reports each
statement that significantly distinguished the two groups. Perhaps
the statement most obviously related to the decision-making crite-
rion was that it is better for society to let some guilty people go free
than to risk convicting an innocent person. Over 62% of guilt-phase
includables agreed while a majority (56.1%) of the Witherspoon-
qualified subjects disagreed. The probability of this difference re-
sulting by chance is less than one in a thousand. The pattern of
response to the other statements show a similar prosecution, crime-
control bias.
The Ellsworth Study.74 In another study by Ellsworth, fourteen
guilt-phase includables and fifteen Witherspoon-qualified subjects
were asked to imagine that they had served on a jury in a homicide
case, reached a unanimous verdict, and later discovered the verdict
was wrong. Each subject was asked to rate on a scale from 1 to 100
the amount of regret they would feel for either a harsh or a lenient
error. The results indicated that Witherspoon-qualified subjects ex-
pressed equal regret for both types of error, while the guilt-phase
includables expressed significantly more regret for harsh than for
lenient errors.
71. Id.
72. 483 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Ark.), modfed, reh'ggranted, 637 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1980).
73. Ellsworth & Fitzgerald, Due Process vs. Crime Control: The Impact ofDeath Qual4K-
cation on Jury Attitudes (unpublished manuscript, 1979) (to be published in LAW & HUMAN
BEHAV. (Summer, 1982)).
74. Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d at 40, 616 P.2d at 1325, 168 Cal. Rptr. 152
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It is better for society to let some
guilty people go free than to risk
convicting an innocent person. 62.5 44.0
A person on trial who doesn't take
the witness stand and deny the crime
is probably guilty. 23.5 32.3
Even the worst criminal should be
considered for mercy. 77.8 44.0
District attorneys have to be watched
carefully, since they will use any
means they can to get convictions. 53.1 48.9
All laws should be strictly enforced,
no matter what the results. 46.3 57.1
A person would not be brought to
trial unless he or she were guilty of a
crime. 26.5 32.3
If the police obtain evidence illegally
it should not be permitted in court,
even if it would help convict a guilty
person. 63.9 56.5
The plea of insanity is a loophole
allowing too many guilty people to go
free. 59.2 78.0
Harsher treatment of criminals is not
the solution to the crime problem. 80.0 59.0
Defense attorneys have to be watched
carefully, since they will use any
means to get their clients off. 64.7 73.5
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Results such as those described in these two studies suggest that
the source of the differences in willingness to convict between WEs
and Witherspoon -qualified subjects may derive from their respective
decision-making criteria and their respective estimates of the costs
of various types of error.
When the other survey evidence is considered, the clear thrust
of the evidence has been to establish that persons who favor the
death penalty are "uncommonly" predisposed to find for the prose-
cution and against the defendant.
All of the studies and all of the surveys display a common ele-
ment: they demonstrate that there is a significant difference between
those potential jurors excludable under Witherspoon and those ju-
rors who could be "death-qualified" under Witherspoon. That is, all
of the studies uniformly support the fireside induction. Under these
conditions, Meehl noted that:
The legislator's, judge's, or administrator's situation is most com-
fortable when there is a sizable and consistent body of research,
experimental and nonexperimental (fie data and field observa-
tion data), yielding about the same results as the fireside induc-
tions. While one may be scientifically skeptical even in this
harmonious situation, in the pragmatic context of decision mak-
ing, rule writing, or policy adopting, such rigorous skepticism can
hardly lead to pragmatic vacillation. Some sort of action is re-
quired, and all we have goes in the same direction.75
The appropriate action would seem to require the conclusion
that death-qualified juries are not only "uncommonly," but also un-
constitutionally, prone to convict. A constitutional decision will, of
course, have to meet the constitutional standard, which requires that
the WE group constitute a distinctive, identifiable group.16 It is ob-
vious, however, that the WE group iZ distinctive and identifiable,
since members of this group are currently excluded on the basis of
their distinctive and identifiable attitudes toward the death penalty.
The convergent conclusions from the fireside induction and from
social science research is that the exclusion is not irrelevant, but ba-
sic to fair and impartial judgments of guilt or innocence.
The appearance of a neutral jury is achieved by eliminating
both the ADP group and the WE group. In reality, jury neutrality is
not achieved, however, and the inadequacy is more than a matter of
75. Meehl, supra note 1, at 27.




the unequal distribution of ADPs and WEs. Haney" has discussed
the range of possible solutions to the multiple problems introduced
by death qualification and has concluded that even modified forms
of death qualification would violate the constitutional requirements
of a fair and impartial trial. Haney's thoughtful analysis suggests
that the most reasonable solution is a bifurcated trial with death-
penalty attitude forming a basis for exclusion only at the penalty
phase. In many jurisdictions, bifurcated trials already occur in civil
cases with one jury assessing liability and another deciding dam-
ages. This practice is especially likely to be observed as the impor-
tance of the case increases, although no such case even begins to
approach the life or death seriousness of capital cases involving
death qualification.
Bifurcation may be in the state's, as well as in the accused's,
interest. Death-penalty trials will not always occur in capital cases;
for example, in Grigsby's case, the death penalty was waived. In
such cases, the expensive death-qualifying voir dire which now pre-
cedes the guilt phase of capital trials can be eliminated, saving sub-
stantial amounts of time and money.
An editor of this journal suggested to the author that a psychol-
ogist could change a light bulb only if the light bulb wanted to
change. The fireside induction and the social science research indi-
cate that the practice of death qualification, like the light bulb, is in
need of change. The real question is whether the legal system, like
the psychologist, can afford to wait.
77. Haney, Juries and the Death Penalty: Readdressing the Witherspoon Question, 26
CRIME & DELINQ. 512 (1980).
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